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Walter Dubislav’s Philosophy of Science and Mathematics1 
 
―Dubislav … knew more about mathematical and logistical [logical] matters 
and the ‗theory of theories‘ [philosophy of science] than anybody I met.‖ 
Karl Korsch, letter to Morton Wurtele, 
February 19, 1953 (Korsch 2001, ix, 1500) 
 
Summary 
 
Walter Dubislav (1895–1937) was a leading member of the Berlin Group for Empirical / 
Scientific Philosophy. This ―sister group‖ of the more famous Vienna Circle emerged 
around Hans Reichenbach‘s seminars at the University of Berlin in 1927 and 1928. Du-
bislav was to collaborate with Reichenbach, an association that eventuated in their con-
jointly conducting university seminars. Sadly, the political changes in Germany in 1933 
proved ruinous to Dubislav. He published scarcely anything after Hitler came to power 
and in 1937 committed suicide under tragic circumstances. The intent here is to pass in 
review Dubislav‘s philosophy of logic, mathematics, and science. The point of this expo-
sition is to shed light on some seminal yet hitherto largely neglected currents in the history 
of philosophy of science. 
 
1. Exact Philosophy by Kant and Fries 
                                                 
1
 For a profile of Dubislav‘s life in connection with his works, see the author‘s. … Our 
Acknowledgements go to the participants on two seminars that we hold at the University of  
 2 
Unlike the majority of the logical empiricists, Dubislav was a distinguished historian of 
logic and philosophy.
2
 He had explored the logical theories of Blaise Pascal, Leibniz, and 
Bernard Bolzano, among others.
3
 But his interest centered above all on Kant and Jacob 
Friedrich Fries. Dubislav regarded these philosophers as especially important because 
both did original and highly influential work in the substantiation (Begründung) of human 
knowledge and in concept-formation, topics central to his formalist philosophy of mathe-
matics and science. That said, while Dubislav followed Kant and Fries on some points, he 
rejected many of their claims. 
 Kant held that while in mathematics we start with the evident, most simple and most 
clear data, in philosophy we begin with what is vague (dunkel) and complicated. While 
mathematical method is progressive (constructing concepts from elements we know via 
intuition), philosophical method is regressive.
4
 The task of philosophy, as Kant saw it, is 
to reveal how our knowledge is substantiated; in other words, its project is to uncover the 
first principles from which our knowledge can be deduced, and ―with the help of which 
we make successful propositions about future events‖ (1929a, 22). 
                                                 
2
 An exception is perhaps Heinrich Scholtz of Münster (cf. Scholtz 1931) who was close to 
the Berlin Group. 
3
 On March 24, 1932, Dubislav even delivered a radio lecture on Albertus Magnus. 
4
 It is interesting to note here that many years after Kant, this dictum was repeated by Ber-
trand Russell almost mot-à-mot: ―While mathematics, starting from comparatively simple 
propositions, seeks to build up more and more complex results by deductive synthesis, phi-
losophy, starting from data which are common knowledge, seeks to purify and generalize 
them into the simplest statements of abstract form that can be obtained from them by logical 
analysis‖ (Russell 1914, 19). 
 3 
In order to do this, philosophy makes use of a ―regressive method of showing [Aufwei-
sen],‖5 or demonstrating, the originating moments—the foundations—of our knowledge. 
We reveal those epistemological foundations through disclosive debate (Erörterung). 
Lastly it judges what is true or false by means of a critical, ―Socratic‖ procedure of as-
sessment (1929a, p. 20). We exercise critical judgments by way of abstraction; but since 
we do not employ inferences in the process, this method is not inductive—though it is 
related to induction. In this regard, explains Dubislav, Kant counted it a great mistake in 
Aristotle to identify critical judgment with induction, after Socrates had articulated it in its 
pure form. 
     Jacob Friedrich Fries followed all these points of Kant‘s critical philosophy. But he 
broke with Kant, Dubislav found, when he (Fries) asserted that the very practice of sci-
ence and mathematics, as well as our moral practice—not merely science and ethics as 
such—is underpinned by first principles.6 Their explicitation (Herausschälen) is effected 
with the help of an ―inductive–empirical‖ method.  
 Fries contended that while we know the basic principles of ―human understanding,‖ 
this knowledge is vague (dunkel). We can make such knowledge explicit through ―psy-
chological analyses,‖ thus ―clarifying our consciousness‖ (1929a, 20). But this sort of 
exposition and clarification of what is at first obscure does not, observes Dubislav, com-
mit the mistake of the psychologism with which it is so often confused, since we do not 
employ exogenous psychological propositions as basic elements of our knowledge. What 
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this process of explication entails is simply analyzing the knowledge—including scientific 
and mathematical knowledge—that we already possess. 
 Fries held that first principles, even those of science and mathematics, change all the 
time.
7
 Kant didn‘t follow this path simply because principles determined in this way can-
not substantiate the practical propositions of his ethics. To be sure, moral practice doesn‘t 
follow any categorical imperative—although we can, in Dubislav‘s view, render explicit 
ever-changing imperatives that are implicit in it (Dubislav 1937). 
 Another salient matter on which Fries took issue with Kant—and here Fries was fol-
lowed by Leonard Nelson
8
 and Dubislav—is the contention that we must justify our 
knowledge. Fries, however, asserted that human knowledge is only to be substantiated, 
not justified. Indeed, he regarded reason as self-sufficient enough not to require justifica-
tion. He pointed out, moreover, that every attempt to justify knowledge leads to circular 
inferences. This is the case because we already know the first principles of our 
knowledge: they also substantiate our skeptical explorations of knowledge. The task of 
philosophy is simply to articulate them. 
 
2. Philosophy of Mathematics  
                                                 
7
 This had been a defining element of Jacob Friedrich Fries‘ epistemology, one that Leon-
ard Nelson later adopted and that Reichenbach subsequently appropriated as well. Dec-
ades after Dubislav, Michael Friedman rediscovered this point (Friedman 2001) while 
examining Reichenbach‘s book Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge (1920). 
8
 Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) was a Neo-Frisian and Neo-Kantian philosopher who mas-
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also Karl Popper (cf. Milkov 2012). 
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Philosophy of mathematics was a leading focus of Dubislav‘s theoretical interest. He 
made several attempts to establish grounds for an approach to the foundation of mathe-
matics as it had evolved by the beginning of the twentieth century. In these undertakings 
he took cues from David Hilbert‘s formalism. 
 In ―On the Relation between Logic and Mathematics‖ (―Über das Verhältnis der Logik 
zur Mathematik‖) (1925/26) Dubislav distinguished three approaches in philosophy of 
mathematics. The logicists, led by Bertrand Russell,
9
 insist that mathematics can be re-
duced to logic, while the intuitionists, centering on the work of L. E. J. Brouwer, defend 
the view that logic is based on mathematics. Following Hilbert, the formalists (Dubislav 
among them) hold that while the principles of mathematics are independent of logical 
principles, mathematics nevertheless depends upon logic in that the latter helps mathemat-
ics by formulating its proofs. 
 Decades before Hilbert, however, Fries had also argued that the subject-matter of 
mathematics is different from that of logic. Fries approached mathematics as a system of 
truths constructed with the help of axiomatic systems that are nothing but synthetic a pri-
ori judgments gained through pure intuition. He asserted, in addition, that definitions can 
fix the meaning of the newly introduced signs (symbols). 
 As against Fries, Dubislav declared that there are no truths in mathematics: the latter is 
only a game of calculating. In fact there are two alternative formal sciences: mathematics 
and logic. The task of logic is to produce true inferences from true premises. If we call the 
sum of all true statements ―the true,‖ then we can define logic as ―science of the true.‖ 
The ―science of mathematics,‖ on the other hand, begins with axiomatic systems that are 
logical in character and are free of contradictions; its aim is to derive the statements that 
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in Leibniz‘s sense are ―potentially included‖ in those systems. Mathematics is conse-
quently the science of the correct (vom Richtigen), not of the true (1925/26, 207–8). 
 In ―On the So-called Object of Mathematics‖ (―Über den sogenannten Gegenstand der 
Mathematik‖) (1930) Dubislav paired Plato‘s and Kant‘s philosophies of mathematics, 
classifying them as old intuitionists. Both Plato and Kant held that mathematics is about 
abstract objects that we grasp with the help of our ―pure intuition.‖ And since objects of 
just that sort are what we also perceive when we cognize our environment (the external 
world), mathematics is the queen of all sciences.  
 Dubislav tells us that Kant approached mathematics as a set of true judgments substan-
tiated by way of their interrelation (1930, 30). As distinguished from the judgments of 
logic, which are tautological, or analytic (Dubislav employed the two terms as synonyms), 
the judgments of mathematics are synthetic a priori. As it turned out, Kant‘s belief that the 
axioms of mathematics (geometry, in particular) are truths was discredited beginning the 
publications of Lobachevsky as early as in 1826 and ultimately by Einstein‘s theory of 
relativity.
10
 
 In opposition to the old intuitionists, Brouwer, Dubislav‘s new intuitionist, taught that 
there are no mathematical truths. Rather, in Brouwer‘s view mathematics is a system of 
constructions based upon immediate intuitions. Judgments in mathematics that are not so 
constructed are meaningless. Hence while Kant and Fries defended the position that we 
can both discover and show the objects of mathematics, its primitive truths, Brouwer ad-
vanced a radical constructivism from the standpoint of which everything that exists in 
mathematics is constructed. Mainstream mathematics, however, would seem to have 
posed a problem for Brouwer since it is based on unrestricted logical growth, in particular, 
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 By way of substantiating this claim, Dubislav referred to Einstein‘s theory of relativity in 
interpretation of his friend Hans Reichenbach. 
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on growth predicated upon the law of the excluded middle. Dubislav explains that 
Brouwer understood this procedure as not justified since logic, as he conceived it, is 
―nothing but a system of rules abstracted from the mathematics of finite sets‖ (1930, 34). 
In other words, it is simply a ―language‖. 
 The empiricism that Dubislav associates primarily with J. S. Mill portrays mathematics 
as a science that explores the general structure of objects in the world. It is a sum, not of 
axioms but of hypotheses or ―experimental truths‖ or abstractions. Following the lead of 
Bolzano, Dubislav dismisses empiricism of this sort, declaring that variables better articu-
late abstractions than do hypotheses.
11
 He contends, further, that empiricism in philosophy 
of mathematics employs psychological concepts, such as ―ideas,‖ that contemporary psy-
chology (of Dubislav‘s day)—Gestalt psychology, for example—reveals to be problemat-
ic.  
 Moving on to conventionalism, Dubislav turns to Henry Poincaré as the leading repre-
sentative, according to whom the axioms of mathematics are definitions in the sense of 
norms (Forderungen) introduced ad hoc as the occasion warrants (1930, 38). As such 
norms, the axioms of mathematics are neither true nor false. Thus, similarly to the neo-
intuitionists, conventionalists hold that mathematics has no independent subject matter 
and, further, that it is no science. Moreover, conventionalists make no claim with respect 
to the truth of mathematical propositions, which they conceive as only systems of arbi-
trary (willkürlich) norms. What this entails is that mathematics is synthetic—conventions 
are to be created—and consequently stands opposed to logic, which is analytic and hence 
tautological.
12
 Moreover, despite the fact that the axioms of mathematics are neither true 
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 This position is closely related to Wittgenstein‘s philosophy of mathematics as expressed 
after 1928, in particular in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Wittgenstein 1956) 
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nor false, we can nonetheless deduce from them all of the fundamental laws 
(Grundgesätze) of mathematics. 
 Norms, however, are always norms of something, and this led critics to challenge the 
cogency of a conventionalism that denies to mathematics any subject-matter and which 
thus has nothing to say about any content associated with its own norms. The formalists 
addressed this challenge by asserting that such norms are about signs (Zeichen),
13
 alt-
hough Dubislav proposed that instead of signs we do better to adduce variables as the 
content of mathematical norms. The formalists, notes Dubislav, also introduced the idea 
of recasting the system of axioms as a system of propositional functions (1930, 40). 
 Formalism sprang from axiomatics. It holds that pure logic and pure mathematics are 
not sciences pursuing truths, but rather calculi. In Dubislav‘s words, ―the pure mathemat-
ics is nothing but a calculus we shall call ‗mathematical calculus‘, in which there is nei-
ther truth nor falsehood, and consequently is arbitrary from logical perspective‖ (1930, 
46). Pure mathematics and logic are simply ―formal games.‖ They start from certain arbi-
trarily chosen initial formulas, and their only objective is to derive other formulas by fol-
lowing particular, arbitrarily chosen rules. Of course, we can attach to these calculi sys-
tems of truths. In fact, scientific theories are nothing but calculi with attached rules of 
interpretation.
14
 Understandably enough, an indispensable element of the formalists‘ task 
                                                                                                                                                        
according to which mathematics advances (invents) new calculi that are not reducible to log-
ic. 
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 According to David Hilbert, ―in mathematics, in particular, what we consider is the con-
crete signs themselves, whose shape is immediately clear and recognizable‖ (Hilbert 1925, 
379; see also Hilbert 1927, 464). 
14
 This is a central point of Dubislav‘s formalist philosophy of science we are going to dis-
cuss in § 4. 
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is to prove that the systems of signs they advance are free of contradiction. Toward this 
end, the formalists apply the technique of the new logic (―logistic‖). To this program Du-
bislav himself contributed in (1929b). 
 With Contemporary Philosophy of Mathematics (Die Philosophie der Mathematik in 
der Gegenwart) (1932) Dubislav returned to the three-pronged discussion of the founda-
tions of mathematics, specifically to the criticism of Kant and the Neo-Kantians (includ-
ing the neo-Friesians), of logicism, and of intuitionism.
15
 A reviewer in The Bulletin of the 
American Mathematical Society at the time found that ―Dubislav‘s comment on these var-
ious doctrines is both pregnant and … correct. … All these theories are rejected—though 
with cordial recognition of their valuable contributions—in favor of formalism, for which 
mathematics is but a game with certain marks and rules. Logic is a part of this game, but 
comparatively elementary one, for it lacks the infinity and selection axioms‖ (Allen 1933, 
330). 
  
3. Criticism of Russell and Wittgenstein 
 Some years prior to Contemporary Philosophy of Mathematics Dubislav launched a 
sharp criticism, in ―In the Relation of Logic and Mathematics‖ (1925/26), of Russell and 
Whitehead‘s logicism, particularly as it appeared in the second edition of Principia Math-
ematica, which had just been published. His first complaint was that PM does not under-
take to demonstrate that the whole of mathematics is reducible to logic, but that only part 
of it is so. More generally, he contended that reducing mathematics to logic is impossible 
in principle. Dubislav insisted that there is a system of statements in the arithmetic of 
whole numbers that is isomorphic with Russell and Whitehead‘s system of logical axi-
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oms. But we cannot prove every statement of arithmetic with the help of only some of 
them, which shows that mathematics is not reducible to logic (1925/26, 199 ff.).
16
  
 Dubislav also offered the following as specific corrections to PM. He: 
 took as primitive the concept of implication, to the cost of the concept of nega-
tion;  
 eliminated the distinction between propositions and propositional functions, as 
well as the distinction between statements and propositions; 
 introduced new primitive concepts in logic, such as the variables ―every‖ and 
―some‖ (1925/26, 203).  
 In his later writings, however, Dubislav tempered somewhat his criticism of logicism. 
In ―On the So-Called Subject-Matter of Mathematics‖ (1930), for example, he opined that 
the sense of asserting that we can reduce mathematics to logic ―depends‖ on how we un-
derstand ―reduce.‖ Indeed, he concedes that ―one can construct [aufbauen] all formulas of 
the mathematical calculi with the help of the logical calculi, but one cannot deduce them 
from the starting formulas of logic‖ (1930, 48). This advocacy of the relative supremacy 
of mathematics over logic found further expression in (1932) and (1937). 
 In Contemporary Philosophy of Mathematics (1932) Dubislav asserted that the close 
relatedness of pure mathematics to pure logic follows from the circumstance that the two 
disciplines have identical principles of concept formation. More specifically, they are both 
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 11 
calculi that help to derive formulas from initial formulas, following specific operator rules 
(instructions), and so have nothing to do with the truth (1932, 41). The formalists hold, in 
addition, that with the help of the logical calculi we can construct all of the formulas of 
mathematics; which means that every proof in mathematics is a purely logical procedure, 
i.e. it is a tautological transformation (1932, 39). This, however, does not mean that math-
ematics can be reduced to logic. 
 Dubislav also attacked Wittgenstein‘s ―dogmatic apriorism‖, according to which tau-
tologies are always true. He poses his initial challenge by questioning the nature of ―this 
strange truth … that cannot be verified‖ (1933, 32). He next points out that the calculi 
(i.e., the tautologies) are not discovered but created, which means that they can‘t be 
senseless.
17
 The claim that tautologies are not senseless is also supported by the fact that 
sometimes we are not sure whether a particular proposition is or is not a tautology. Du-
bislav concluded that tautologies express thoughts, and that consequently we may verify 
them. More specifically, he held that tautologies express facts about our knowledge, not 
about the world; so they are ―knowledge of the second order‖ (1933, 37).  
 
4. Formalist Theory of Science 
 Dubislav was a formalist not only in his philosophy of mathematics but also as a phi-
losopher of science. As we have seen, formalism takes as its leading concern the substan-
tiation of our knowledge. Dubislav maintained that we substantiate scientific knowledge 
in three ways, namely by recourse to logic, to probability, and to experience. Besides sub-
stantiation, the issue of definition is also essential to formalist epistemology. And while 
substantiation is indispensable to deductive modes of knowing (i.e., in derivation of 
knowledge), definition plays a central role in concept formation. 
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 Dubislav defined scientific theories, at first tentatively, as systems of statements ex-
pressed in a language and interrelated in ―nets of substantiation.‖ He also argued that ―ob-
jects‖ (which included facts and events in his terminology), concepts, and axioms figure 
as fundamental truths (Grundwahrheiten) in scientific theories. The formalists unequivo-
cally attach (koppeln), and so co-ordinate (zuordnen), objects and concepts of science to 
calculi, supplying by means of this procedure rules of interpretation (1930, 47).
18
 Relative 
to this, Dubislav also remarked that to this purpose, scientists may employ different (al-
ternative) formal systems.  
 Operating with the foregoing account of scientific theorizing, the formalist articulates a 
system of statements about the objects and concepts of science with specific relations be-
tween them, replacing in this way the scientific theory with a calculus, with a system of 
signs. In general, to formalize a scientific theory or discipline means to disregard whatev-
er cannot be captured by the theory of relations.
19
 The formalist‘s task, more exactly, is to 
construct such a network with the aid of formal logic (1930, 44). 
 We can also say that the initial system of fundamental statements (Grundbehauptung-
en) that the formalist derives from a scientific theory corresponds to systems of proposi-
tional functions that we attach to the calculus, while the objects of the fundamental state-
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 In his Philosophy of Nature (1933) Dubislav criticized this formulation. Following the lat-
est publications of Carnap (1932), he now maintains that this is only a ―realistic way of talk‖ 
(Redeweise) that, strictly speaking, is incorrect. In truth, we connect statements with state-
ments that are nothing but formulae. We so connect formula to formula. The formulae of sci-
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constants‖ (1933, 86 f.). 
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bellow. 
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ments are cast as variables in the formulas of calculi (1931, 71). In the new physics, for 
example, the formalist philosophy of science assumes the task of axiomatically examining 
(durchmustern) the theory of relativity (1931, 107).
20
 It is in this way, concluded Du-
bislav, that pure logic and pure mathematics contribute to our knowledge of the objects 
(i.e. facts) in our environment and their ―behavior.‖  
 This line of analysis led Dubislav to embrace the radical position that scientific theo-
ries are nothing but elements of logical–mathematical calculi (1932, 47). Insofar as there 
are different calculi that are free of contradiction, as well as different kinds of arrange-
ments of objects of the world captured in theories, there are alternative scientific theories 
that are intrinsically isomorphic. 
 The first step in formalizing a scientific discipline is, for Dubislav, to turn it into a hy-
pothetic-deductive system that is free of gaps—that is, without presuppositions that aren‘t 
explicated. Dubislav calls this ―an axiomatic construction [Aufbau] of the discipline‖ 
(1933, 22). The next step is to take the system of the principles that ground the discipline 
and distil it into a system of relations, not a system of truths. Lastly one spells out the sys-
tem with the help of the calculi of mathematics and logic. Among other things, this meth-
od substantiates Leibniz‘s claim that the universal character of logical/mathematical for-
malism enables us to express any thought whatsoever.  
 Dubislav‘s formalist theory of science would seem to bracket all structures that fail to 
exhibit any relational character. Unquestionably this is to render the content of science 
quite austere. For all of its austerity, however, this formalist philosophy of science exactly 
affirms the inter-logical relations in scientific theories, and that is what is of interest in 
epistemology of science. An essential proviso that bears on the limits of this theory is Du-
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bislav‘s insistence that the scientific theories we venture to formalize are to be restricted 
only to those that lend themselves to the formalizing procedure. 
 
5. Definitions 
 Theory of definition is the kernel of analyticity and also of analytic philosophy. A. J. 
Ayer, for one, maintained that the main business of the then new analytic philosophy was 
to provide definitions-in-use, or implicit definition (Ayer 1936, 80). This was also the 
purport of Russell‘s theory of descriptions—―that paradigm of philosophy‖ (Ramsey). It 
argued for replacing (i. e. translating salva veritate) propositions about entities with which 
we are not acquainted with propositions about those with which we are. 
 What has been largely forgotten, however, is that Dubislav was the first philosopher to 
make the theory of definition his prime theoretical concern. This focus reflected Du-
bislav‘s orientation as a radical formalist in philosophy of mathematics and science—as a 
matter of fact his work on definitions was prompted by his investigations into Hilbert‘s 
axiomatic method.  
 Typically, Dubislav initiated his study of definitions in his magnum opus (1931) with a 
historical review of the subject. Aristotle, he noted, had explored definitions as explana-
tions of objects. The important modern developments in theory of definition originated 
with distinguished French mathematicians and philosophers. In De L’Esprit Géométrique 
et de l’art de persuader (1658) Blaise Pascal introduced the Cartesian inspired precept 
that every expression in a definition must have a clear and unambiguous meaning. Pascal 
further stipulated that every statement in a definition needs to be based on statements that 
we know to be true. Later, it was the French mathematician J. D. Gergonne who intro-
duced into logic (in 1818/19) the concept of implicit definitions, or definitions-in-use. To 
 15 
remind the reader, in implicit definitions, the newly introduced sign receives its meaning 
through its relation to the signs already available in the system (1931, 40). 
 The theory of definitions attributable to Kant and Fries has two sides: in mathematics 
and in the mathematical sciences we have concept formation, while the philosophical side 
features concept analysis or criticism (1931, 12 ff.). Dubislav explained that in both cases 
concepts are not given but rather derive from a process which he terms ―concept determi-
nation.‖ Concept determination in mathematics and the mathematical sciences is synthetic 
or progressive, affirmed Dubislav, while in philosophy it is analytic or regressive (1931, 
113).
21
 
 In order better to understand the notion of concept determination, however, one needs 
first to be clear about the nature of concepts as such. Empiricists regard concepts as gen-
eral ideas. On the other hand, idealists such as Bolzano, Lotze and Husserl took concepts 
to be ideal objects that, like values, cannot be thought in more fundamental terms: we 
simply discover and grasp them.
22
 Lastly, the formalists (Dubislav included) treated the 
concept as a sign that takes the form of a propositional function with one variable (1931, 
113–16).23 
 Beyond the notion of concept determination, Dubislav‘s theory of definitions also in-
cludes, as we‘ve seen, a program of replacing scientific theories with formal systems of 
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signs. The guiding requirement is to apply only those instructions for substitution that 
prove correct operationally in a formal calculus.  
 Dubislav‘s original contribution to the theory of definitions was the ―calculation crite-
rion of definitions,‖ which introduced pure ―combination games‖ into the process of defi-
nition (1931, 81). The purpose of such games of definition is to generate novel constella-
tions of ―game pieces‖ from initial ones, proceeding strictly according to the rules of the 
game. Ultimately, what Dubislav argued for was ―fairly played [formal] games‖ 
(spielgerecht spielende Spiele) of definition, games with respect to which the problems of 
truth and contradiction have no bearing. It is from this standpoint that he spoke of ―game 
theory‖ of definition. 
 
6. Criticism of Frege’s Theory of Definition 
 Reflecting his doctrine of definition is Dubislav‘s rather critical review of Frege‘s the-
ory of definitions, which as it turned out was one of the very first evaluations of Frege‘s 
logic to appear in print. Historically, Dubislav‘s criticism of Frege‘s theory of definition 
needs to be seen against the background of the Hilbert–Frege controversy (cf. Blanchette 
2012). While for Frege the thought was fundamental in logic, Hilbert held that the calcu-
lus is the fundamental element of logic, the position Dubislav adopted. 
 The main thrust of Dubislav‘s criticism is that in contrast to the formalist theory of 
definition, Frege‘s logic reduces the role of definitions to merely regulating the linguistic 
form of statements and not statements themselves. On a more general level, Frege posited 
that each discipline consists both of a constellation of mutually substantiating statements 
and of the language in which those statements are articulated. Regarding language Frege 
distinguished descriptions (Kennzeichen) from simple signs, discriminating ―complete‖ 
(vollständige) from ―incomplete‖ language signs. Unfortunately, Dubislav falsely identi-
 17 
fies them as ―saturated‖ and ―unsaturated‖ signs (1931, 31).24 In the process he introduced 
his classic distinction between the sense and reference (Bedeutung) of language signs. 
Frege taught that the object of a complete sign is its reference, while the way that a com-
plete language sign signifies that object is its reference (1931, 31). However, Dubislav 
tells nothing about the difference between sense and reference of propositions, as different 
from names, by Frege. 
 Dubislav took Frege to task for failing to clarify how we are to employ signs to con-
struct the formulas of the definiens, and also for failing to clarify the language articulating 
such formulas (1931, 68). One cannot say the same, by the way, of either David Hilbert or 
C. I. Lewis, both of whom utilized simple and unequivocal game signs, or marks, that are 
not necessarily part of natural language. 
 On the positive side, Dubislav expressed his conviction that Frege‘s theory of defini-
tion newly reset the terms of the foundations of a science (of arithmetic, in particular), the 
concepts of which need to be well defined. Every definition of a sign that a science de-
duces (derives) amounts to a reduction of the sign to ―fundamental sign,‖ or Grundzeichen 
(1931, 33). Historically, philosophers of logic have postulated a whole array of alternative 
fundamental signs. For instance, space, time, movement, the concept ―all‖ count among 
the Grundzeichen that Pascal introduced.  
 Another contribution of Frege was the fruitful distinction between senseless proposi-
tions and propositions with sense. Dubislav interpreted the latter as propositions that we 
could regard as formulas in logical calculi (1931, 117). We cannot, on the other hand, 
impose strict criteria for what counts as senselessness. Put more precisely, when we make 
scientific discoveries, we utilize concepts—―atom,‖ for instance—which, says Dubislav, 
                                                 
24
 In Frege‘s logic ―saturatedness‖ means something completely different (cf. Weiner 2004, 
74–77). 
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are strictly speaking senseless (1933, 27). Cogent scientific language is something 
achieved only after science has already accomplished its main work.
25
  
   
7. Structural Theory of Truth 
 By 1930 Dubislav was also devoting his energies to the truth of scientific theories—
this by contrast with the members of the Vienna Circle at the time, who preoccupied 
themselves with the truth merely of propositions of science.  This sharp difference in the 
focus of their research projects traces back to what Dubislav took as the starting point of 
his exact philosophy: the axiomatic method and the theory of definitions. Dubislav con-
ceived the truth of scientific theories to be a function of the theory of definitions. Indeed, 
instead of replacing simply signs with other signs, to Dubislav the task of science simply 
was to replace ―objects‖ (under which Dubislav also includes events and facts), of the 
external world with sign systems, or theories. 
 In this connection Dubislav calls attention to Leibniz, who long since had shown that 
in the same way in which we explore natural numbers with the aid of digits, we can inves-
tigate the objects of science with the help of a theory. Dubislav maintains that the con-
cepts of the theory and the ―objects‖ of its realm relate in the same way.  
 Turning to a nineteenth-century thinker, Dubislav notes how in the Preface to his Me-
chanics, Heinrich Hertz contended that the objective of scientific theory is to make ―pic-
tures‖ of its objects, so that the possible deductions from these pictures are also pictures of 
what is deductively derived from the initial objects (1930/31, 35).
26
 To this Dubislav add-
                                                 
25
 Years later, Karl Popper will use virtually the same argument against the logical positivists. 
26
 It is well-known today that Hertz was also the genealogical source of Wittgenstein‘s ―pic-
ture theory‖ of languagein the Tractatus. The connection between Wittgenstein and Dubislav 
was apparently Joseph Petzoldt, who was not only Dubislav‘s ―Habilitationsvater‖ (chief su-
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ed that the deductions themselves occur as transformation of formulae—as calculi con-
structed with the help of specific rules. The scientific theories deduced from the configu-
rations of the initial objects of science, in their turn, are nothing but the formations we 
gain with the assistance of these calculations. What Dubislav ultimately concludes from 
this is that to claim that the world is causally determined is to mean nothing more than 
that we can conceive it as in every detail isomorphic with the calculus (1930/31, 34 f.). 
 According to Dubislav‘s doctrine of truth proper, if a scientific theory is to be true, it 
must have the same structure, be isomorphic with, the states of affairs (or objects) it 
treats: ―A theory is true if and only if there is an isomorphic relation between it and the 
objects explored‖ (1930/31, 37). The appeal to isomorphism here has its source in Rus-
sell‘s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (Russell 1919, 52–62). Unlike Russell, 
however, Dubislav took ―isomorphism‖ to refer to an identity between the two sides of a 
relation (1933, 18). 
 This understanding of isomorphism might lead one to expect that Dubislav subscribed 
to a correspondence theory of truth. What he in fact argued for, however, was a coherence 
theory of truth, as is clear when he declares that ―we never verify the truth of a statement 
independently from the already known‖ (1930/31, 33; see also 1933, 24). It‘s worth not-
ing for the historical record that Dubislav embraced the coherence theory of truth before 
either Otto Neurath, in ―Sociology and Physicalism‖ (1932), or Carnap, in ―The Physical 
Language as Universal Language of Science‖ (1932). 
                                                                                                                                                        
pervisor of his second dissertation), but also thought Wittgenstein mechanics when the latter 
studied at the Berlin Institute of Technology (Technische Hochschule zu Berlin) between 
1906 and 1908. Petzoldt‘s lectures on mechanics, which the young Wittgenstein attended, 
closely followed Heinrich Hertz on this subject (cf. Graßhoff 2006). 
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 The main thesis of Dubislav‘s theory of truth is that a single experiment cannot conclu-
sively verify a scientific theory: at best it may falsify it.
27
 Dubislav contended that this is 
the way in which scientific revolutions have often occurred, citing by way of illustration 
the Michelson-Morley experiment, which discredited once and for all the ether theory of 
light (1930/31, 34). 
 Moving on the twentieth century and referencing the works of Richard von Mises, but 
in fact clearly following Reichenbach, Dubislav further develops his doctrine of truth in 
light of his recognition that science operates not only with causal laws but also with statis-
tical laws. He cites in this connection the scientific method operative in establishing Hei-
senberg‘s indeterminacy (uncertainty) principle, which established that the measuring of 
two related quantities in the micro-world is fundamentally undetermined. 
 
8. General Philosophy of Science 
 Over the years, Dubislav‘s interest in philosophy of logic and mathematics expanded in 
the direction of general philosophy of science. This development found expression in 
1933 with the publication of his last book Philosophy of Nature (Naturphilosophie). 
 
8.1. The Alleged Pragmatism of Dubislav’s Philosophy of Science 
 In the Preface of Philosophy of Nature Dubislav announced that the book was written 
from the standpoint of Hermann von Helmholtz‘s idea that as human beings we have a 
specific cognitive apparatus that helps us to interpret the world. On this view, the basic 
task of science is to adjust our actions with the aid of our knowledge so that we achieve 
our ends (1933, 47).  
                                                 
27
 Carl Hempel criticized the latter conception, defended by his teacher Dubislav, in his PhD 
thesis. See Hempel 1935b, 248 f. 
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 One readily discerns Helmholtz‘s quasi-pragmatist doctrine in Dubislav‘s claim that 
scientific exploration is embedded in the practice of life (Lebenspraxis).
28
 Amplifying this 
position Dubislav reminds us that science also makes use of ordinary language and its 
scheme of representation (1933, 40). Epistemologically speaking, science simply develops 
in a systematic way what we already knew unsystematically in our daily life. Even an 
elementary observation is based on some ―invariants‖ of our routine knowledge. 
 This position had decisive consequences for Dubislav‘s epistemology. Most signifi-
cantly, it rendered problematic the objects of our perception. Paradoxically enough, we 
cannot say that we ―see‖ or ―observe‖ them (1933, 43). The point is that elements of our 
past everyday knowledge are tacitly ingredient in the act of seeing, of observing, which 
we perform at any given moment.
29
 Dubislav inferred from this that just as the latest theo-
ries of scientific investigation are not established ―truths‖ but merely convincing accounts 
of things, so the very sources upon which scientific investigation builds are inherently 
vague (1933, 53). 
 A most telling implication of Dubislav‘s insight here is that the view of naïve realism 
in the epistemology of science is mistaken. We cannot compare, or present as correspond-
ence relation, a particular formulation of knowledge with its object (or fact). The same 
can be said about the positivism, including the logical positivism, which proposes to con-
                                                 
28
 Reichenbach‘s alleged pragmatism, as expressed in Experience and Prediction (1938) and 
elsewhere, followed Helmholtz on this point, and not Peirce or James, as it was often sug-
gested. 
29
 As today we say, our scientific observations are ―theoretically laden.‖ It is highly probable 
that on this point Dubislav followed the supervisor of his second dissertation (Habilita-
tionsschrift) Joseph Petzoldt who maintained that ―there is a theory in every ‗fact‘ ‖ (Petzoldt 
1927, 159). 
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struct the world of science from the angle of a single observer—from the viewpoint, that 
is, of ―methodological solipsism.‖30 Positivism incurred a further irremediable difficulty 
to which Dubislav also called attention: it predicates our knowledge overall on statements 
that we simply accept as true—we don‘t and in fact can‘t prove that they are true (1933, 
46 ff.).
31
 
 Dubislav also censured positivism for promulgating the notion that while common 
sense often regards two cases of the given in our visual perception (for example, a glass of 
water and a glass of liquor) as identical, science finds that, ―in truth,‖ they are different. 
Against this, Dubislav argued that science does not interpret the observations of common 
sense as false (sie weginterpretieren), but rather as subjective. What this means is that, for 
all their subjectivity, common-sense observations retain their absolute character. For this 
reason, asserts Dubislav, we can call common-sense perceptions absolute and construe 
them as ultimate indicators of fact (Tatsachenanzeiger). By contrast, the objective, scien-
tific picture of the world is relative—indeed, it changes with every new scientific discov-
ery and with every new well-grounded theory. The most certain fact of our perception 
would seem to be the immediately and simultaneously registered differences (different 
cases of perception of the same object) in it (1933, 49). Thus subjectivity and absoluteness 
apparently go together in philosophy of science.  
 At the same time Dubislav shows that in reality it is not difficult to construct scientific 
intersubjective systems of statements. Supporting this claim is the fact that scientific theo-
ries have practical success, which means that their theoretical expectations are confirmed 
                                                 
30
 This is a clear critic to Carnap‘s Aufbau project in which the method of ―methodological 
solipsism‖ played a central role. 
31
 Dubislav‘s critique and justification of human knowledge was shortly presented in § 1. 
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simply as a matter of course. As noted at the outset of the present section, this argument 
was also central to Helmholtz‘s concept of how science interprets reality.  
 
8.2. Methods of Scientific Investigation 
 Dubislav‘s Philosophy of Nature is also an original inquiry into ―the general methods 
of investigation of natural science‖ (1933, 3). What distinguished Dubislav‘s study from 
the philosophy of nature as treated by the likes of Schlick or Zilsel
32
 is that it is not ex-
pressly concerned with aporiai specific to science. Instead, it systematically explores the 
logical and methodological problems of scientific knowledge (Hempel 1934, column 
760). Thirty-three years after the appearance of Philosophy of Nature Dubislav‘s former 
student, Carl Hempel, published Philosophy of Natural Science (1966). While justly 
hailed a groundbreaking book in the Anglophone philosophy of science,
33
 scarcely any-
body has noticed that on many points Hempel‘s work follows Dubislav‘s lead (Milkov 
2014).  
 As an exponent of the philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) Dubislav undertook to 
elucidate the general research methods of science, such as those applied in definition and 
the methods of substantiation. He also explored the role of observation, experiment and 
inference in science. Unlike Francis Bacon and J. S. Mill, who strove to formulate the 
rules of scientific inquiry, Dubislav scrutinized the praxis of leading scientists from the 
past, tracing the methodology of, for example, Isaac Newton in his formulation of the 
theory of gravitation—that paradigm of scientific theory.34  
                                                 
32
 Cf. Schlick (1925), Zilsel (1928). 
33
 Philip Kitcher called Hempel (1966) ―one of the great introductions to any field of philoso-
phy‖. (Kitcher 2001, 158) 
34
 Hempel worked in a similar way, exploring cases of history of science. Cf. Hempel (1966). 
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 A problem that Dubislav addressed in this line of investigation is the difference be-
tween observation and experiment. The introduction of the experimental method was a 
milestone in the progress of science. Experimental praxis involves limiting the number of 
possible interpretations by varying the conditions of the experiment (1933, 54). But exper-
iments, Dubislav insisted, are fruitful only when they are connected with a relevant theo-
ry. An important point that Dubislav underscored, one later reasserted by Carl Hempel, is 
that there are no expermienta cruces that serve as signposts to direct science down the 
right path. Dubislav insisted, however, that there are experiments that decisively falsify 
theories.
35
 While one could hardly expect such results from thought experiments, Du-
bislav nonetheless assessed their nature as well and concluded that thought experiments 
serve the scientist as a very expedient in the process of theory formulation (1933, 60). 
  Dubislav held it to be a necessary condition for producing an observation statement 
(Beobachtungsaussage) that one needs to articulate it in an inter-subjective, trans-
sensible, and universal language.
36
 As we have seen, however, pace naïve empiricism and 
positivism, Dubislav rejected the view that there are pure observation statements. Moreo-
ver, he found that no strict boundary exists between observations and hypotheses, the lat-
ter being, in the most general sense, assertions that go beyond the setting of observations 
(1933, 62). 
 Dubislav maintained that observation statements derive from inspections, that they do 
not require substantiation, and that no subsequent inspection disproves an observation 
statement. With the help of statistical analyses that yield the average value of observation 
                                                 
35
 Cf. n. 27. 
36
 On this point Dubislav shook hands with Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap. 
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statements,
37
 we can formulate intermediate statements (Zwischenaussagen). Moreover, 
with the appropriate hypotheses, we can also derive from intermediate statements addi-
tional intermediate statements that, in their turn, point to statements of observation whose 
values are captured statistically by those additional intermediate statements (1933, 66).  
 By contrast with observations, hypotheses, noted Dubislav, are to be substantiated. 
Unlike tautologies we do not derive them, and they may serve as the very source from 
which the scientist educes other statements, including observation statements. Dubislav 
declared that if a requisite number of statements of observation based upon a hypothesis 
are true, we can consider the whole complex of formal notation, language, observation 
statements, observations, intermediate statements, experiments, and hypothesis verified 
(1933, 65). In fact, scientific theories are nothing but such formal notational complexes. 
Dubislav cautions, however, that we can never verify with absolute certainty the proposi-
tions of science. Consequently, no simple criteria are available for determining the truth 
or falsehood of scientific theories (1933, 68–9). 
 In his discussion of the methods of scientific investigations Dubislav also introduced 
the concept of ―logical behaviorism,‖ a notion that his pupil Carl Hempel would take up 
in his own writings (Hempel 1935a, 381).
38
 But what Dubislav meant by ―behaviorism‖ 
differs fundamentally from the familiar psychological sense of term made famous by John 
B. Watson. Dubislav‘s behaviorism is rather what Neurath and Carnap had called ―physi-
calism,‖ which Dubislav understood as the claim that all propositions of science are inter-
subjective (1933, 69). 
                                                 
37
 Dubislav follows here Reichenbach‘s interpretation of probability as the limit of relative 
frequencies. 
38
 The introduction of the concept ―logical behaviorism‖ is often mistakenly credited to 
Hempel. 
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 To be sure, Dubislav was aware that some things simply cannot be expressed inter-
subjectively—our experiences, for example. These Dubislav classed as ineffable (un-
sagbar) in principle, as incommunicably private. On the other hand, he claimed that what-
ever we can communicate we can express in the language of physicalism (1933, 71). This 
position mirrored that of the Vienna Circle (and, ultimately, of Frege and Wittgenstein) 
and this is one of the few points on which Dubislav followed his Vienna friends Schlick, 
Neurath and Carnap.
39
 
 Finally, prefiguring Hempel on another aspect of scientific methodology, Dubislav 
maintained that, in principle, the natural sciences and the humanities have joint methods 
of investigation and that they both are reducible to the given. However, since they are at 
different stages of development, Dubislav insisted that it is not appropriate to assign the 
methods of natural science to those of the complexly evolved humanities, which achieve 
methodological exactitude in their theoretical ventures only step by step (1933, 99). 
 
8.3. Description and Explanation 
Besides scientific method, Dubislav also subjected to detailed analysis the problem of 
scientific explanation, a theme that would became prominent in Carl Hempel‘s philosophy 
of science.
40
 The positivists maintain that science simply describes facts of reality, a posi-
tion Dubislav associates with the Germanophone physicist G. R. Kirchhoff and Ernst 
Mach. Mach, in particular, held that science, following the ―principle of economy,‖ aims 
to describe the given (1933, 93). According to Pierre Duhem, too, a theory of physics 
doesn‘t produce explanations, but rather descriptions. 
                                                 
39
 Cf. n. 37. 
40
 To be true to the historical record, the problem of explanation and description in science 
was discussed long before Dubislav. Cf. Rickert (1896, 78–91).   
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Dubislav characterized descriptions as statements about the given, about the ―this ex-
actly‖ (dies da) of observation statements and intermediate statements. In contrast, the 
explanation of a process, event, or phenomenon is an epitome (Inbegriff) of statements 
that treat a phenomenon‘s ―behavior,‖ and gets formulated on the basis of selected obser-
vations. Explanations can be useful, argues Dubislav, if they derive from a calculus and 
are accompanied by rules linking them (via Kopplungsvorschriften) to phenomena (1933, 
94). In fact, the natural sciences employ both methods—description and explanation. Ra-
ther than the principle of simplicity (or economy), the sciences employ instead the princi-
ple of truth, according to which scientific statements must be verifiable (prüfbar) at least 
in principle. 
  
9. Epilogue 
Walter Dubislav was a leading member of the Berlin Group who played a defining 
role as well in the work of the Society for Empirical / Scientific Philosophy in Berlin. 
Dubislav produced original work in philosophy of mathematics, logic and science, conse-
quently following David Hilbert‘s method of axiomatic. This brought him to defend for-
malism in these disciplines as well as to exploring the problems of substantiating human 
knowledge. Dubislav also developed elements of general philosophy of science. In con-
trast to other logical empiricists, he showed intensive interest into history of exact philos-
ophy, trying to explicate important points of it and to develop them further. 
At the height of his career Dubislav enjoyed celebrity status; and yet, unaccountably, 
the decades since his death have seen his formative contribution to the philosophy of sci-
ence virtually consigned to oblivion. The chief aim of this conspectus has been twofold: 
to call attention to the distinguished level of Dubislav‘s achievement and to prompt wider 
recognition of his seminal achievements as a philosopher of science.     
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